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“Extend the sphere, and you take in a variety of parties and 
interests; you make it less probable that a majority [and 
under plurality, a minority] of the whole will have a 
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or, if 
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all 
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in 
unison with each other.”1 
 
 
“New candidacies and new coalitions serving as viable 
competition mean opportunity for substantive and public debate of 
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The health of democracy is on the minds of many 
Americans as they grow impatient with our current political system. 
So, it is no surprise that Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) is gaining 
more notice. The RCV election method contributes to the growth 
of our local, state, and national democracies by increasing the 
viability of candidacies, diversity of candidates, voter choice, and 
number of candidates winning with a true majority. RCV allows 
voters to vote based on their beliefs as opposed to making a choice 
based on the fear of “spoiling” or “wasting” their vote. 
 
RCV is a timely issue. Voters have increasingly adopted 
RCV and supported first-time independent candidates in the face of 
numerous threats to our democracy. In just the last three years, 
voters made Maine the first state to adopt RCV and New York City, 
the most populous city in the country, the 20th municipality to adopt 
the method. That the electorate is energized by these changes and 
appears to hold wide-spread interest in stepping outside of our two-
party system that is supported by the plurality, first-past-the-post 
method of election is evidenced by growing resistance to 
establishment candidates and the increasing number of people 
identifying as independent.2 Voters are tired of candidates winning 
with a low percentage of the vote through the first-past-the-post 
system and of being forced to compromise their values in casting 
their vote. RCV is one way to address the national and state changes 
in election law and political processes and, therefore, more voters 
should have RCV as an option for expanding local and state 
democracies. 
 
RCV exists interdependently with other election laws and 
reform efforts. As a result, RCV may be more effective in furthering 
the growth of our democracy if supplemented with additional 
reforms. Through an examination of the history of American use of 
RCV, coupled with a look at multiple election law reforms that 
impact the core areas of democracy, we consider opportunities for 
 
2 For the purpose of this paper, “independent” should be interpreted as 
unaffiliated, not to be confused with members of the Independence Party. 




further reform that will strengthen the value of RCV to our 
democracy. Specifically, we will assess campaign finance reform, 
multimember districts, and ballot access reforms as strong potential 
companion efforts to further the impact of RCV. 
II. RCV DEFINED 
RCV, which is alternatively referred to as preferential or 
choice voting, is an election method aimed at ensuring a true 
majority winner (50%+) instead of the plurality system currently 
used in most American elections. Whereas RCV is the commonly 
used umbrella terminology, it has several variations depending on 
the structure of the district; in single member districts it is called 
Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV) and in multi-member districts it is 
called Single Transferable Vote (STV).3  
 
The RCV process gives voters the opportunity to rank 
candidates on their individual ballots. Once the polls close, the 
ballot counting process begins with a review of all voters’ first 
choice candidates. If a majority winner results from the first round, 
that candidate is the winner and use of the instant run-off process is 
not necessary. If there is no majority winner, the instant-runoff 
process ensues. The candidate with the least first choice votes is 
eliminated and the votes for that candidate are counted towards the 
 
3 See RCV Activist Toolkit, FAIRVOTE.ORG, 
https://www.fairvote.org/toolkit#educate (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). These 
authors recognize that RCV has many different names depending on the point in 
time and location. For instance, internationally, it is common for RCV to be 
referred to as proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR), 
which is a multi-member district that allows for the ranking of candidates. The 
idea of a single transferable vote (the operation of transferring one vote based 
pursuant to one’s preference) has also been referred to as the “Hare system,” a 
reference to the individual credited for its invention. See Clarence Gilbert, 
Hallett Hoag, & George Hervey Jr., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION § 13 at 6 
(1926). The RCV process for multi-member districts is slightly different, using a 
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second choice votes on all of those ballots.4 The process continues 
like this until a winner is identified.56 
 
RCV may be adopted through a variety of methods and may 
vary in terms of guidelines. RCV may be adopted by charter or 
legislation at any level of government. Laws adopting RCV 
establish guidelines, which vary by municipality. Some RCV laws 
set a maximum number of ranking slots on a ballot, as well as the 
type of elected offices that will be determined through RCV.  
 
Currently, RCV is used in twenty municipalities within ten 
states, and one of the states (Maine) adopted the voting method 
statewide. 7  Most recently, in November 2019, New York City 
voters voted to amend the City Charter and adopt RCV as the 
method to be used in primary and special elections.8 In 2016, Maine 
adopted RCV for all state and federal primary elections and 
implemented the process for the first time in the 2018 elections. 
Minneapolis has used RCV since 2009, and San Francisco, 
Oakland, and Berkley have been using RCV since 2010. This paper 
will briefly look at RCV data from each of these municipalities to 
illustrate outcomes of the RCV method, including the increased 
likelihood of true majority candidates.9 
 
Across municipalities and states, RCV is intended to 
increase the likelihood of an election resulting in a true majority in 
 
4 See Ranked Choice Voting, FAIRVOTE.ORG, 
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#how_rcv_works (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
5 See Jack Santucci, Evidence of a Winning-Cohesion Tradeoff in Muti-
Winner Ranked-Choice Voting, 52 ELECTORAL STUDIES 128, 128-38 (2018).  
6 As part of this ballot counting process, ballot exhaustion may occur. 
This is the process by which a ballot is no longer usable because all choices/ 
votes ranked on a given ballot have been reviewed, counted toward a subsequent 
round, and all candidates chosen and ranked by that voter lost the race. 
7 See Where Ranked Choice Voting is Used, FAIRVOTE.ORG, 
https://www.fairvote.org/where_is_ranked_ 
choice_voting_used (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
  8 New York was one of two dozen municipalities who adopted 
a multi-member form RCV (PR) in the early twentieth century. See 
Kevin Reyes, Redistricting or Rethinking? Why Proportional 
Representation May Be a Better Solution Than California’s 
Independent Redistricting Commission, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 655, 
674.(2011). 
  9 See discussion infra Part III.E. 




the first round or as a result of the ranking process, which allows 
voters to rank preferences based on their own ideological priorities. 
In doing so, RCV allows voters to vote based on their beliefs as 
opposed to making a choice based on the fear of “spoiling” or 
“wasting” their vote. Subsequent and related arguments for RCV 
will be discussed following a contextualization of RCV in 
American history. 
III. RCV HISTORY 
To most effectively understand the purpose and current state 
of RCV, it is necessary to review its historical roots in American 
elections. For that, we look at the history of proportional 
representation (PR) here in the United States. In American history, 
district structure and ranking were intertwined to comprise the 
election method called PR. PR was paired with the single-
transferable vote, allowing the voter to rank candidates, though not 
all proportional representation models do. 10  PR is a method of 
voting that aims to give equal representation to the district involved. 
As opposed to single-member districts, the area is split into larger 
districts or at-large districts, and instead of voting for one 
representative, many representatives are elected. The ideal result is 
for many viewpoints to be reflected in the district’s representatives. 
A. The Rise of Proportional Representation 
In 1910, before a Conservative Group in Glasgow, Scotland, 
Arthur J. Balfour (afterward Earl Balfour) called for reform of a 
seemingly age-old problem: 
 
“[W]hile a small handful of interested people can 
turn an election one way or the other on their own 
personal issue, huge minorities, like the minority of 
the Unionists in Scotland, are utterly and grossly 
unrepresented. We give every little privilege to the 
 
10 See generally How Proportional Representation Elections Work, 
FAIRVOTE.ORG, https://www.fairvote. 
org/how_proportional_representation_elections_work (Dec. 16, 2019). 
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little knot of people in the individual constituencies; 
we ignore the great mass who under our existing 
system find no representation at all comparable 
either to their numerical strength or to their public 
spirit, or to any other quality, which makes them 
useful, able, and independent citizens.”11 
 
The call for reform was not limited to Scotland. 
Accordingly, some of the greatest thinkers of our time called for the 
adoption of PR as a solution. John Stuart Mill wrote at length of the 
need for reform and true representation in the United Kingdom.12 
Mill strongly believed that PR was a tool to create greater 
engagement and increased diversity of thought: 
 
“[i]ndependent opinions will force their way into the 
council of the nation and make themselves heard 
there, a thing which cannot often happen in the 
current forms of representative democracy; and the 
legislature, instead of being weeded of individual 
peculiarities and entirely made up of men who 
simply represent the creed of great political or 
religious parties, will comprise a large proportion of 
the most eminent minds of the country, placed there, 
without reference to party, by the voters who 
appreciated their individual eminence . . . [A]ny one 
who does not feel the want which the scheme is 
intended to supply; any one who throws it over as 
mere theoretical subtlety or crotchet, tending to no 
valuable purpose, and unworthy of the attention of 
practical men, may be pronounced an incompetent 
statesman, unequal to the politics of the future.”13 
 
Leaders were skeptical of Mill’s perspective of PR; but, 
some, such as Leonard H. Courtney, came to embrace the approach. 
 
 11 See Gilbert et. al., supra note 3, §173 at 299. 
  12 Id. at 293 (“My complaint is that the electors are not represented... 
Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this 
one affords the best security for the qualifications desirable in the 
representatives…”).  
 13 Id. at 296 (quoting John Stuart Mill, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1875)). 




In a letter to the Prime Minister advocating for PR’s adoption, 
Courtney admitted his apprehension, but, on Mill’s 
recommendation, believed it could provide hope in the fight against 
political corruption of the day: 
 
“I was . . . strongly convinced of the injury done to 
our national life by the deleterious training more or 
less undergone by every man who is drawn into the 
political world, and by the loss of men who are shut 
out of it as refusing to submit to this training . . . Mr. 
Mill hailed with enthusiasm the revelation of the true 
principle of representation. It gave him, he said, a 
new hope.”14 
 
These same problems abroad were mirrored in American 
municipalities. One of the focal concerns was voter 
disenfranchisement. In Cincinnati, for example, critics of American 
politics at the time believed that this disenfranchisement was a 
result of disproportionate party power (the Democratic party was 
“weak,” and a “Republican nomination amounted to an election”).15 
“Candidates were trained to feel they were representatives not of 
the public, but of the party.”16 The parties had a stronghold on the 
entire system. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the elected 
individual was irrelevant; what mattered was whether the party 
leaders were willing to re-nominate or not.17 
 
In response, community leaders formed a committee to 
implement reforms, including the adoption of PR. Of the 
committee organizers involved, women from both the League of 
Women Voters and the Woman’s City Club were critical to the 
movement. 18  The committee organized a speaking tour and 
 
  14 Id. at 298 (quoting Letter from Leonard Courtney to W.E. Gladstone, 
Prime Minister (Nov. 8, 1884) [hereinafter Lord Courtney of Penwith] in 
support of the adoption of proportional representation and its incorporation in 
the Redistribution Bill). 
15 See Henry Bently, Why Cincinnati Voted for P.R. and a City 
Manager, 14 NAT’L MUN. REV.  69, 69 (1925). 
  16 Id. 
  17 Id at 70. 
  18 Id. at 72. 
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gathered media support. In the end, Cincinnati was successful and 
PR was adopted with a vote of 92,510 to 41,105.19 
B. Proportional Representation’s Impact on Democracy 
PR successfully diluted party monopolies while setting the 
stage for more ethnic and racial minorities to be elected in districts 
where they had not: 
 
“Many [who advocated for PR] were concerned 
[aside from issues of child labor laws and woman’s 
suffrage] about the corruption in urban governments. 
Large cities often were dominated by party 
“machines” of which Tammany Hall . . . was the 
most infamous . . . . [PR] also encouraged fairer 
racial and ethnic representation . . . . It produced the 
first Irish Catholics elected in Ashtabula, and the first 
Polish Americans elected in Toledo. In Cincinnati, 
Hamilton, and Toledo African Americans had never 
been able to win city office until the coming of PR. 
Significantly, after these cities abandoned PR, 
African Americans again found it almost impossible 
to get elected.”20 
 
Another example of this regarded success is illustrated by 
Mr. Samuael Seabury’s response to the unsuccessful attempt to 
dissuade the New York public from repealing PR. To relay PR’s 
impact of diluting party monopolies, Seabury recounted the days 
when the powerful New York City political organization, Tammany 
Hall, “steam rolled” over everyone in its path and the positive 
changes witnessed in the city’s government afterward. Seabury 
shared these contemporaneous observations: 
 
“The Tammany steam roller has stopped and the 
quality of Council action has steadily improved . . . . 
 
19 Id. 
20 Douglas Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES 267, 269 (2d ed. 2002) 
(emphasis added). 
 




From the first, with the cooperation of members on 
both sides of the aisle, it has passed all the important 
measures before it . . . that were obviously needed for 
the welfare of the city . . . . After the Democrats got 
over their first outraged shock at finding a substantial 
and vocal opposition, its procedure has become on 
the whole orderly and constructive . . . . Hearings are 
held on important measures at which the public is 
given courteous attention and many of its 
suggestions adopted, and debate on the floor brings 
out all important issues of controversial questions. 
Most bills are passed in a form approved by virtually 
the whole council, often because suggestions of the 
minority members have been accepted by the 
majority.21 
 
Of all the democratic improvements attributed to PR’s 
success, a significant increase in voter turnout was not one of them. 
Instead, the data indicated the “emergence and disappearance of 
local issues and candidates appear to have had more to do with the 
act of voting than did the form of the ballot.”22 History shows that 
companion reforms to the PR (and ranking) process were necessary 
then as well. 
C. The Fall 
PR was not supported by all. On the heels of the widely 
regarded success of PR came a series of well-funded attacks in each 
 
21 Samuel Seabury, Letter to the Editor: In Favor of PR, N.Y. TIMES , 
Oct. 31, 1947. 
  22 See Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 20, at 271. 
Though, for some this may seem like an argument against adopting some form 
of choice voting, the authors believe it is quite the contrary. In a district where 
RCV is employed and is successful in driving more exciting candidates and 
issues, it is quite possible that voter turnout, especially over time, will be 
favorably affected. However, if in the same district, RCV is employed, but 
existing ballot access issues prevent viable candidacies of these would-be 
candidates, one could imagine that voter turnout will not be favorably affected. 
See discussion infra Part VI. 
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municipality that had adopted it.23 Anti-PR leaders and coalitions 
led forty-nine attempts to repeal PR. 24  The strategy for repeal 
involved a propaganda campaign that sought to scare voters into 
repealing the relatively new reforms. Ultimately, the strategy was an 
overwhelming success and PR was repealed in every jurisdiction 
except Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
The anti-PR propaganda and repeal campaign took shape 
differently depending on the municipality. In New York City, the 
repeal campaign took on the form of anti-communist sentiment, 
which was reflected in an editorial by The New York Times 
editorial board. 25  The editorial board used its considerable 
 
23 See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947 (an appeal to voters to 
repeal PR, while acknowledging that it had “endorsed” PR and “defended it 
against its critics.”). In Cleveland, both the Republicans and Democrats sought 
to repeal PR, yet the success of Cleveland’s new government was “almost 
universally acclaimed,” and “everyone admitted the Council was the best 
Cleveland had ever had.” As a result, the reason for the repeal was largely seen 
as an effort by the parties to regain power. Norman Shaw, Cleveland’s 
Proportional Representation Election,14 NAT’L MUN. REV.589, 589-90 (1925). 
24 See Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of 
Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the United States, in 
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 149 
(Bernard Grofman & Arend Liphart eds., 1986). These forty-nine attempts 
occurred over multiple election cycles. 
25 However, the anti-communism sentiment could have been “dog 
whistle” language for racism as well. See, e.g., IMANI PERRY, LOOKING FOR 
LORRAINE 43-59 (2018) (describing Lorraine’s involvement in the Communist 
Party, its funding of Freedom [a progressive newspaper], and the U.S. 
government’s targeting of prominent Black, communist activists including 
Lorraine herself, W.E.B. Dubois, and Paul Robeson). The Communist Party was 
also affiliated with the National Negro Congress, a group that advocated against 
Jim Crow and was instrumental in finding solid working-class jobs for African 
Americans. See National Negro Congress, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-
maps/national-negro-congress (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). Additionally, Pete 
Cacchione, one of the communists elected to the New York City Council in 
1941, whom the Times editorial board found objectionable, was known to 
advocate for “an end to all practices of discrimination whether directed against 
the Negro people, the Italian people, the Jewish people, or the foreign born.” See 
Amy, supra note 20, at 208. 




reputation to urge voters to repeal PR.26 One of several reasons 
listed for this anti-PR advocacy was that PR was a tool for radical 
groups that threatened American elections: 
 
“Communists and other radicals who could not, by 
normal majority and district voting methods, have 
hoped to become members and giving them an 
official sounding-board for views shared only by a 
mere fraction in the electorate.”27 
 
The editorial board went on to chastise the PR elected 
council for failing to take the important work of public 
transportation fare reform in favor, rather, of “such trivialities” as 
the name of Sixth Avenue. Samuel Seabury countered this attack in 
a letter submitted to the council.28 Seabury argued that the council 
had actually taken up many important issues that term, including 
“evictions, rent control, abuses in garages and parking spaces, and 
fire hazards in apartment hotels and dormitories,”29 suggesting the 
editorial board was twisting the facts for its own ends, namely the 
repeal of PR. 
 
 
26 Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947. The editorial board made a 
similar appeal in April 1947. 
27 This statement proved to be inaccurate and misleading. At least two 
sources debunk the idea that these “radicals” were not widely supported by those 
outside their party. In the case of Pete Cacchione, only 1/10 of the voters that 
elected him were of the communist party. Because of his ideas, he was able to 
gain the support of many working-class New Yorkers, and he received the most 
first-place votes out of ALL council members in the 1943 election cycle. See 
Amy, supra note 20, at 208; See also George H. Hallett, Jr., Importance of PR: 
Abolishing Proportional Representation Believed Against Civic Good, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1947 (“What bothers [the editorial board] obviously is that there 
are two Communists on the council, 8.7 percent of the whole body…The fact 
remains that these particular Communists amassed 138,498 votes, which is 8.2 
percent of total valid vote cast…You couldn’t get any closer to accuracy with 
cutting Councilmen into fractions.”); Seabury, supra note 21. 
28 It is assumed this is Judge Samuel Seabury, a direct relation of 
Bishop Samuel Seabury. Judge Seabury served on the Court of Appeals and was 
instrumental in investigating and uncovering corruption within the infamous 
Tammany Hall. See Samuel Seabury Playground, NYCGOVPARKS.ORG, 
https://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/samuel-seabury-playground/history (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2019). 
  29 See Seabury, supra note 21. 
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In Cincinnati, the repeal campaign used a different angle. 
Elections of African American council members influenced what 
was a race-based repeal campaign. Repeal proponents took 
advantage of this and the growing tensions around the civil rights 
movement and “warned whites that PR was helping to increase” 
power in the African American community while raising the specter 
of a future “Negro mayor.”30 Like those in New York City, repeal 
proponents argued that minority and “fringe” perspectives uplifted 
by PR were a threat to American democracy. By 1960, New York 
City, Cincinnati, and every other municipality (with the exception 
of Cambridge) had renounced the PR voting system that had offered 
so much promise.31 The widely supported rise of PR for purposes 
of increased equity and ideological diversity quickly led to fear 
based attacks and the demise of the system. 
 
The history of PR makes clear that its only true “fault” was 
that it worked too well to be popular among entrenched interests.32 
IV. IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF PR, RCV IMPROVES DEMOCRACY 
RCV improves democratic processes and engagement by 
promoting: (1) increased viability of candidacies; (2) broader 
diversity of candidates; (3) increased voter choice; and (4) greater 
likelihood of achieving a true majority winner. These are benefits 
to voters, interested candidates, coalitions and parties, as well as 
our greater democracy. RCV’s positive impact on democracy in 
these four areas is evident through a preliminary review of RCV 
data from three of the American cities that have implemented RCV 
for the longest period of time: San Francisco, Berkeley, and 
Minneapolis. 
A. RCV creates opportunities for increased viability of candidacies. 
When voters can rank candidates and there is a run-off 
process, more candidates are viable and the pool of candidates is 
more diverse. Viability of a candidacy commonly refers to the 
ability of candidates and coalitions to competitively run races and 
 
30 See Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 20, at 273. 
  31 See Weaver, supra note 24, at 140. 
  32 See Amy, supra note 20, at 274. 




for voters to perceive those candidates as actual options, not 
spoilers. RCV establishes greater viability through factors such as 
the likelihood of increased media coverage, the diminished impact 
of majority party names over all others, and the increase in healthy 
competition in campaigning, all of which stem from the increased 
competition because of ranking and run-offs. 
 
The increased viability of candidacies impacts individual 
candidacies and the creation and/or strengthening of minor parties 
and independent candidacies within major parties. RCV limits one 
dominant party’s influence in primary and general elections and 
creates space for more viable candidates. This means more variety 
of ideological perspectives and more debate over nuances in 
perspective. By creating more space for multiple candidates (and 
parties) to viably take part, the conversation shifts, providing the 
opportunity for dominant parties or candidates to adopt others ideas 
in an effort to earn higher ranking with potential voters.33 
 
Increased viability impacts voter engagement, tone of 
campaigning, and turn-out for two reasons. First, candidates have 
incentive to engage broader groups of people beyond their 
traditional base, and conduct more positive campaigning when 
multiple candidates run. Regarding engagement, a 2013-2014 study 
conducted by Fair Vote comparing RCV and non-RCV cities in 
California and Minnesota, showed that candidates in RCV cities 
increased interpersonal interaction with voters through in-person 
outreach, whereas in non-RCV cities candidates relied heavily on 
outreach by phone.34 In-person outreach has the greatest impact on 
social deliberative engagement—the reflective and interactive 
processes of confirming, exploring, and/or changing individual 
thoughts—which contributes to building in-person trust and 
political knowledge.35 RCV incentivizes broad engagement because 
candidates may have a chance of being 1st, 2nd, or 3rd choice, 
whereas candidates in a plurality system will likely only reach out 
 
  33 See Katherine Q. Seelye, As Australia and the Oscars Go, So Goes 
Maine? N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018)  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html. 
  34 See, HALEY SMITH, Ranked Choice Voting and Participation: 
Impacts on Deliberative Engagement, FAIR VOTE  9-10 (June 2016) 
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/DeliberativeEngagement. 
  35 Id. at 10. 
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to the voters who are already most likely to support them.36 Second, 
RCV incentivizes more positive campaigning by candidates and 
parties. Several media-content studies indicate that coverage and 
tone of campaigns was more positive and cooperative in RCV 
cities. 37  Additionally, opportunity to rank, and the increased 
viability of candidacies, has led to a third factor impacted by RCV: 
increased voter turnout in primaries in RCV. 38  As a result of 
broadened engagement and more positive campaigning, RCV 
contributes to a shift in political culture. In turn, viability is likely 
further impacted by these factors. 
B. RCV leads to broader diversity of candidates. 
With greater viability comes greater opportunity for more 
racial, religious, gender, ethnic, and ideological diversity in 
candidates. In a plurality system, the major parties pick the two 
viable candidates. In doing so, the current system limits ideological 
diversity and narrows the opportunity for other types of diversity 
simply because there are (typically) only two viable candidates to 
choose from. By contrast, RCV incentivizes more first-time 
candidates and more candidates challenging incumbents. This, in 
turn, enriches diversity in ideology as voters have the opportunity 
through ranking to distinguish perspectives from major party 
candidates. RCV, naturally, then creates more opportunity for 
candidate diversity by broadening the field of candidates from 
which the voter is free to rank according to preference.39 
 
Greater viability of candidacies, representation from more 
coalitions, and greater diversity of candidates, also provides 
opportunities for major parties. New candidacies and new 
coalitions serving as viable competition mean opportunity for 
substantive and public debate of ideas—the foundation of 
democracy—and help limit misuse of party power. This is good for 
voters, candidates, parties, and democracy. Instead of a party 
 
  36 Id. at 11. 
  37 Id. at 4. 
  38 See, FAIRVOTE.ORG, The Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting 
Raised Turnout 10 Points, https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/kimball-anthony-
turnout (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). Note: While primary voter turnout 
increased, there was no change in general election voter turnout. Id. 
  39 See supra text accompanying note 5. 




hoarding power for the benefit of individual leaders, the focus 
should be on building coalitions based on shared values and 
strategies. Through competition and debate, parties are pushed to 
improve messages and strategies and expand perspectives. In this 
regard, RCV creates greater accountability of candidates and 
parties to the public and contributes to minimizing party leaders’ 
use of power to limit competition. Through RCV, voters and 
communities have greater power to guide the political climate and 
election results. This increased voter and community power would 
be further impacted when intersecting election reforms are 
accomplished, which will be further discussed. 
C. Voters have greater choice through the RCV system. 
Closely related to increased viability and diversity is 
increased voter choice. Voters in RCV jurisdictions can vote for 
their most preferred candidate(s) instead of weighing votes 
strategically.40 This allows voters to vote, by rank, in alignment with 
their ideological perspectives. By contrast, the plurality system acts 
as disincentive to choosing the candidate you favor; if a preferred 
candidate is not a favorite, you are forced to vote strategically or not 
at all.41 
D. RCV produces a true majority candidate more often than the 
plurality system. 
Lastly, RCV’s ranking approach increases the chance of a 
true majority winner, meaning the candidate who wins with over 
50% of the vote in the first round. 42  Comparatively, when the 
instant-runoff process is used for races in which the first round does 
not produce a true majority candidate, the instant-runoff process 
 
  40 See, Michael Lewyn, Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting, 6 
PHOENIX L. REV. 117, 125 (2012). 
  41 See, David Cobb, Patrick Barrett & Caleb Kleppner, Preserving 
and Expanding the Right to Vote: Ranked Choice Voting, ADVANCE: THE 
JOURNAL OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS 107, 110 (2007). 
42 See, FAIRVOTE.ORG Data On Ranked Choice Voting, 
https://www.fairvote.org/data_on_rcv#research 
_rcvsocialchoice (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). 
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allows for finding “agreement through ranking,”43 which occurs as 
a result of ranking and counting based on common ideology to find 
a majority perspective. 
E. What does the impact of RCV look like in American cities? 
These four benefits of RCV are reflected in the data from 
three cities that have implemented it for the lengthiest period of 
time: San Francisco, Berkeley, and Minneapolis. Since these cities 
implemented RCV, there appears to be a favorable, increasingly 
democratic shift in the result of the elections and their processes. In 
particular, all three of the cities’ data suggests greater viability and 
diversity of candidates, increased voter choice, and high true 
majority results in RCV elections. 
 
San Francisco: 44  San Francisco implemented RCV in 
municipal elections for eight elected offices in 2004 and allows 
voters to choose up to three candidates per race. The local Board 
of Elections is scheduled to offer ballots and equipment that will 
increase the number of ranking lines to ten starting in 2019, thus 
giving voters even greater choice. Based on a preliminary review 
of the RCV data from fifty-eight San Francisco elections, there are 
high numbers of candidates running for office, increased viability 
and diversity, and high numbers of true majority winners. In 75.8% 
of races (44 races) three or more candidates ran and only 12% (7) 
had no contender. Though San Francisco had more than three 
candidates in most races prior to RCV implementation (unlike 
other cities), and therefore the number of candidates alone wasn’t 
the major impact of RCV, reports have shown that voters have a 
greater opportunity to voice their choice(s) and relay their layered 
perspectives through the ranking process. In the most recent San 
Francisco race for mayor 85% of voters ranked at least two 
 
43 See, Lee Drutman, If We’re Abolishing the Electoral College, Let’s 
Also Have Ranked Choice Voting for President, VOX, Mar. 21, 2019, 
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2019/3/21/18275785/electoral-college-ranked-
choice-voting-president-democracy. 
  44 See Generally, CITY OF S.F. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS, past election 
results, https://sfelections.sfgov.org/past-election-results. 




candidates and almost 70% ranked three.45 The large majority of 
voters take the opportunity to rank. This suggests that voters are 
exercising choice, but also implies that there are strong perceptions 
of viability of the candidates they are ranking and that there may 
be more candidates running who represent the perspectives of more 
voters.46 
 
In addition to numerous candidates, viability of candidacies, 
and increased voter choice, there is both an increase in candidate 
diversity, and a very large majority of races won with a true 
majority. California counties that adopted RCV saw a 38% increase 
in the numbers of non-white candidates running.47 Though it is not 
clear if there is a direct link between the high numbers of candidates 
running, viability, and diversity with those factors being represented 
in who actually wins elections, it is safe to say that the “agreement 
through ranking” concept that is core to RCV has played out in some 
form, as evident in the data on true majority wins. Ninety-six 
percent of the races evaluated resulted in a true majority (56 of 58 
races) and 56.8% (33 of those 58) won that true majority in the 1st 
round. The benefits of RCV voting evidenced in San Francisco’s 
elections also appears in the two other cities examined. 
 
Berkeley: 48  Berkeley implemented RCV in 2010 for the 
Mayoral, Council, and Auditor general election races, and gives 
 
  45 See, FAIRVOTE.ORG, San Francisco Democratic Party Backs Ranked 
Choice Voting, 
 (Sept. 4, 2018) 
https://www.fairvoteca.org/san_francisco_democratic_party_backs_ranked_choi
ce_voting; Charlotte Hill, Christopher Jerdonek & Viva Mogi, SF Elections are 
Working and Getting Even Better, S.F. EXAMINER, June 28, 2018, 
https://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/sf-elections-are-working-and-getting-
even-better/. 
  46 Research on San Francisco races has shown that use of the 
ranking option varies depending on factors such as number of candidates 
running and competitiveness. Pedro Hernandez, San Francisco Report: RCV 
is Working as Intended with Positive Voter Experience and Increase in Voter 
Turnout and Use of Rankings, FAIRVOTE.ORG, May 23, 2018, 
https://www.fairvoteca.org/san_francisco_report. 
  47 See FAIRVOTE.ORG, San Francisco Democratic Party Backs Ranked 
Choice Voting, supra note 45. 
48 ALAMEDA CNTY. REG. OF VOTERS, Archived Elections, 
https://www.acvote.org/election-information/archived-elections. 
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voters the option to rank up to three candidates per race.49 Since 
implementation, Berkeley has seen an increase in the number of 
candidates running, more diverse candidates, and a large majority of 
races winning with a true majority. Since implementation, RCV was 
used in twenty-five races for these seats. Eighty-four percent of 
these races (21 of 25) had contenders, and 60% (15) had more than 
two candidates running. Following the implementation of RCV, 
there was a clear increase in voter choice—and, to at least some 
degree, viability of candidacies—as more than two candidates ran 
in most races compared to pre-RCV elections. In the 2004, 2006, 
and 2008 races for Mayor, City Council, and Auditor, only 33% (3 
of 9) of races had more than two candidates running. As noted 
above, Berkley has also seen an increase in diversity of candidates 
running since the inception of RCV, and 100% of races resulted in 
a true majority—76% resulted in a true majority in the 1st round. 
 
Minneapolis: 50  Minneapolis has experienced similar 
improvements to democratic functioning as San Francisco and 
Berkeley. The city combines the primary and general elections into 
one election through the use of RCV, and allows voters to rank up 
to three candidates on their ballot. The city uses RCV for the 
election of Mayor, City Council, Board of Estimation and 
Taxation, and Parks and Recreation. Out of forty-two RCV races 
for Mayor and City Council since implementation in 2009, only 7% 
of these races had no contenders, whereas 83.3% had more than 
two candidates running, and 61.9% had more than three candidates. 
In 2001 and 2005, the two election cycles for mayor and city 
council preceding the  implementation of RCV, no races for Mayor 
or City Council had more than two candidates running. Like 
Berkeley, there was a clear increase in viable candidacies and, 
thereby, voter choice. Additionally, a review of the 2017 election 
in Minneapolis showed an increase in the diversity of candidates 
 
49 Id. 









and winners.51 In eighteen of twenty-two races across the city, a 
woman and/or person of color ran, and a woman and/or person of 
color won in twelve of these races.52 
 
As noted previously though, there is not yet a clear direct 
link between number of candidates running, greater viability, and 
the majority winner. The Minneapolis RCV data similarly suggests 
that the “agreement through ranking” concept was evident as 
85.7% of these races resulted in a true majority and 69% resulted 
in a true majority in the 1st round. 
V. RCV OPPONENTS CHALLENGE ITS PROPOSED BENEFITS 
Opponents to RCV put forth a number of arguments to 
dissuade municipalities from adopting the process. 53  The most 
common anti-RCV arguments are (1) RCV is too complex for voters 
to understand; (2) RCV does not necessarily “give voters a greater 
voice;” (3) RCV will disrupt important coalition building that 
happens around our current two-party system; and (4) RCV is not 




  51 FAIRVOTE MINNESOTA, Ranked Choice Voting 2017 Election Report, 
https://www.fairvotemn.org/ 
ranked-choice-voting-2017-elections-report. 
  52 Id. 
  53 In its early form RCV was attacked as the voting system that 
helped bring Hitler to power. See, Elsie S. Parker, Books in Review, 30 Nat’l 
Mun. Rev. 313-14 (1941) (Reviewing Ferdinand A. Hermens, DEMOCRACY 
OR ANARCHY,(1940)). But cf., Amy, supra note 20 at 207 (Arguing Hitler and 
the Nazi party were the most popular party in Germany at the time and would 
have handily won in a FPTP election). 
  54 Other arguments could be and have been made. Some have argued 
against RCV for cost reasons. These authors do not address that argument in 
full here, but will note, however, up to this point, over a dozen municipalities 
have implemented RCV and none have found it cost prohibitive, nor is it 
documented as a reason for repeal by the early adopters in the twentieth 
century. Furthermore, the status quo generates other costs that are equally, if not 
more, important to consider, including the cost of what a disenfranchised 
society can mean for neighborhoods and the reduction of generational poverty. 
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A. Is RCV Too Complex? 
Since RCV was adopted, critics have argued that it is far too 
complex for the average voter. This critique suggests that the 
ranking process, number of lines, and array of choices make it too 
complex. Voter education is certainly a worthy consideration;55 
however, research and a review of the history suggest that 
complexity is not a barrier to RCV for voters. Additionally, even if 
it were a barrier, it would not be insurmountable; it can be 
overcome with education and refinement of the process. 
 
Current research shows that the ranking process does not 
confuse voters, and that over time voters become increasingly 
engaged in the use of ranking to exercise choice. A review of the 
2018 midterms in three RCV cities revealed low errors, and self-
reports of satisfaction with the ranking process.56 In Minneapolis, 
 
  55 The infamous “butterfly ballot” incident is an example of a new 
ballot system implemented in a FPTP race where more voter education was 
necessary. See, Don van Natta, Jr. & Dana Canedy, The 2000 Elections: The 
Palm Beach Ballot; Florida Democrats Say Ballot’s Design Hurt Gore, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/us/2000-elections-
palm-beach-ballot-florida-democrats-say-ballot-s-design-hurt-gore.html 
(recounting how one county in Florida, Palm Beach, had implemented a new 
ballot system that year that led to 29,000 invalidated ballots due to voter 
confusion on how to use the new ballots, which ostensibly had been redesigned 
to be more legible for seniors). With respect to voter education, other 
municipalities have implemented RCV giving us models to work from to 
ensure the public is not disenfranchised in the same as thousands of Palm 
Beach County voters; But see, Scott James, A critical spotlight shines on 
Ranked Choice Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/us/a-critical-spotlight-shines-on-ranked-
choice-voting.html.  (Expressing concern with San Francisco’s adoption of 
RCV, citing the potential for voter confusion). As  discussed, however, San 
Francisco’s RCV process had been successful in increasing democracy. 
Therefore, instead of a deterrent, James’ article serves as a reminder that voter 
confusion concerns with respect to RCV, at this point, are largely unfounded. 
  56 THEO LANDSMAN, DREW SPENCER PENROSE, & ROB RICHIE, Ranked 
Choice Voting in 2018: A Mid-Year Report: Analysis of Turn Out, Voter 
Experience, and Election Administration,6 (July 2018) 
https://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_in_2018_a_mid_year_report. 
(Noting that an exit poll of Santa Fe voters revealed a 96% satisfaction rate with 
the voting experience)  




prior to rolling out RCV, the municipality took great pains to 
prioritize voter education.57 The process included an early voting 
trial, voter outreach for feedback on the trial, and a rework of the 
system based on the trial results. Because of their diligence, 
Minnesota successfully implemented the process in time for their 
2009 elections, and Minnesota voters have been enjoying its benefits 
since then. 
 
Historically, anti-PR groups have contradicted themselves 
when they argued that the process was overly complex. For 
example, The New York Times editorial board argued that because 
people were failing to rank all available candidates, the system was 
too complex. In the same breath, however, the board contradicted 
itself, noting that the Democrats had managed to use the new system 
“adroitly” and that “Communists and others had become skilled in 
‘bullet’ voting,” but the Republicans had failed to “make their voice 
felt to a degree commensurate with their numbers.” 58  These 
statements indicate the system could not have been prohibitively 
complex, because otherwise Democrats, Communists, and “others” 
would not have had such success using it. 59  The more likely 
explanation, is that the Republicans had failed to earn a ranked vote, 
and the Communists had managed to gain more votes than were 
commensurate with their numbers. 60  Given the successful 
navigation of the RCV process by voters both historically, and 
contemporaneously in places like Minneapolis, Berkley and San 
Francisco, there is no question that complexity is not a barrier to 
pursuing the benefits of RCV. Nevertheless, for RCV efforts to 
succeed, voter education on the process, and voter turnout, are key.  
 
57 MINNEAPOLIS MINN. ELECTIONS & VOTER SERV., 
Minneapolis Ranked Choice Voting History, 
http://vote.minneapolismn.gov/rcv/RCV-HISTORY. 
58  See, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947. 
  59 Paling in comparison to placing a man on the moon, the advent and 
widespread use of computers and cell phones, and an economy that enables us to 
buy and sell goods across the globe, RCV seems all the more achievable by those 
standards. 
60 See discussion supra Part II. 
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B. Does RCV Violate the One Person One Vote Requirement?61 
Opponents of RCV also argue the ranking system violates 
the one person one vote constitutional requirement because it seeks 
to eliminate “wasted votes.” 62  In Baber v. Dunlap, 63  Plaintiffs 
argued Maine’s RCV law was an unconstitutional violation of the 
one person one vote requirement. The court rejected this argument 
and found instead that RCV “actually encourages First Amendment 
expression.”64 In coming to its conclusion, the court noted Maine 
citizens implemented RCV to espouse “third party and non-party 
candidates” by giving voters the option to vote for their candidate(s) 
of choice through the ranking process and thus dispense with the 
spoiler effect. The court further noted that votes cast for an 
unsuccessful first-choice candidate were not “rendered irrelevant or 
diluted” as they were counted and distributed to the remaining 
candidates based on the voter’s indicated preference, if any.65 As 
stated by the court, an election methodology that seeks to increase 
access to democracy and increase voters’ ability to more fully voice 
an opinion with respect to candidates, can only be said to further 







  61“Extend the sphere, and you take in a variety of parties and interests; 
you make it less probable that a majority [and under plurality, a minority] of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or, if 
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to 
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” Baber v. 
Dunlap, 376 F. Supp. at 137 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10). 
  62 In RCV, “wasted votes” can refer to two different problems. The 
first are a voter’s first choice votes cast for the last place candidate. The 
second are excess votes received by a candidate who receives more votes than 
are necessary to win. The latter occurs with respect to multi-member districts. 
See generally, How Proportional Representation Works supra note 10. 
  63 Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 137.  
  64 Id. at 145. 
65 Id. at 141. 
66 Id. 




C. Will RCV Adversely Impact the Two-Party System? 
If history is any indication,67 then it is likely the two-party 
system would be adversely impacted. However, what opponents 
perceive as an adverse effect may simply be an evolution of the 
electoral process. Americans are increasingly identifying as 
independent. A 2018 Gallup Poll shows 42% of voters identify as 
independent, 30% identify as Democrat, and 26% identify as 
Republican.68 With more people seeking to be truly represented by 
their party, RCV provides, in part, the catalyst needed to force 
political parties to more definitively define their values and make 
room for other parties that are willing to represent the values the 
major parties refuse to. As we saw in PR, the likely result is that 
major parties will hold a less powerful majority and incorporate 
minor party views.69  Therefore, this departure may be welcome 
based on shifts in party affiliation and evidence of an electorate that 
is actively choosing to decidedly reject “business as usual” 
candidates, positions, and party politics. Both trends will be further 
discussed in Section V, Timeliness of RCV. 
D. Is RCV the best vehicle for expanding the political power of 
minority parties? 
The largest benefit to minority parties is the elimination of 
the spoiler effect, which occurs when voters cast their vote 
strategically, rather than according to preference, in order to avoid 
“wasting” their vote on a candidate that has little chance of winning. 
This causes a great problem for voters and for candidates. 
 
  67 It was the two major parties that targeted PR in the early 20th 
century. See Shaw, supra note 23, at 590 (“From the beginning, the campaign 
line-up showed partisan forces on the one side, and independents on the 
other.”). 
  68 Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Embrace Political 
Independence, GALLUP (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/245801/americans-continue-embrace-political-
independence.aspx. 
  69 Of course, this may not be desirable. Some already argue the 
breakdown in government we see today is due to major parties increasingly 
moving away from the center, where compromise is more likely. Yet, others still 
would wonder at the value of such compromise. Ultimately, however, this is a 
balance that must continue to be studied and debated. 
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Independent and minor party candidates are painted as non-viable 
and blamed by members of the major party if it’s believed the 
candidate detracted votes from the major party candidate. Similarly, 
for voters who wish to vote in line with their values, they are also 
susceptible to blame for the loss of major party candidates. The 
most recent example of both instances, of course, is the 2016 
election, in which Jill Stein’s candidacy and anti-Hillary Clinton 
voters were demonized after Hillary Clinton lost the election to the 
current President, Donald Trump.70  
RCV provides a solution to both independent candidates and 
independent voters because voters are given the option to rank and, 
therefore there is no threat of “wasting” their vote. The second or 
third place candidate can still win with a majority, and, as discussed, 
the once outlier candidate has a greater potential to establish a viable 
candidacy. This was borne out in PR, where a Communist candidate 
garnered more first- place votes than any of the other candidates 
running.71  Therefore, RCV makes it possible for elections to be 
more about principles than power, and, as a result, makes our 
democracy stronger. However, as discussed in the companion 
reforms section of this paper, RCV is not the only reform required 
if minor parties are to be more successful. 
VI. TIMELINESS OF RCV 
In the wake of growing threats to our democracy, the 
American electorate is both increasingly resistant to establishment 
politics and supportive of RCV. Several examples of current events 
show support for RCV, resistance to establishment politics, and 
threats to our democracy. These events make clear the timeliness 
of (re)consideration of RCV. 
 
 
  70 See, e.g., Anthony Zurcher, What Happened: The Long List of Who 
Hillary Clinton Blames, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41244474; Tara Golshan, Did Jill 
Stein Voters Deliver Trump Presidency?, VOX (Nov. 11, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13576798/jill-stein-third-
party-donald-trump-win. 
  71 See discussion supra Part II. 




A. Support for RCV 
In just the last three years, voters have chosen to adopt RCV 
in three municipalities and one state. Maine became the first state 
to adopt RCV in 2016 and began implementation in 2018. Amherst, 
Massachusetts voted for RCV in 2018 and is pending 
implementation for 2021. Lastly, two cities voted in this most recent 
November 2019 election cycle to adopt the method as well: New 
York City and East Hampton, Massachusetts. These additions bring 
the count of RCV municipalities and regions to twenty-three.72 In 
addition to increased support from the electorate, RCV was recently 
boosted by the previously noted Baber case, which upheld the 
constitutionality of the RCV method in Maine.73 
 
In addition to these successes for RCV, legislation has been 
proposed at the federal level and state level in New York as well. 
The federal legislation, The Fair Representation Act, was proposed 
in 2017 and, as of this writing, is currently sitting in committee. The 
Act would establish the use of RCV to elect House representatives 
and establish a commission to redistrict House seats to have 
multiple members per district.74 Relatedly, a bill was proposed in 
New York State in 2010 to establish a pilot study of RCV in eleven 
municipalities across the state.75 The bill has been proposed every 
session since 2010 and is currently sitting in the Elections 
committee.76 These political and legal developments contribute to 
the timeliness of the RCV method for expanding local and state 
democracies. The electorate is energized by changes such as these, 
as well as the number of first-time and independent candidates. The 
growing RCV movement suggests an interest in stepping outside of 
our current two-party system. 
B. Resistance to Establishment Politics 
Both wide support for independent candidates and the 
increasing number of voters who identify as independent are 
 
  72Where Ranked Choice Voting is Used, FAIRVOTEFAIRVOTE, 
https://www.fairvote.org/where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
73 See discussion supra nn. 61-63 and accompanying text. 
  74 Fair Representation Act, H.R. 3057, 115th 
CongressCong. §1(a) (2017),). 
  75 A7492A, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009)).  
76 S.2517, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).  
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evidence of the growing resistance to establishment politics. 
Voters are tired of candidates who have toed party lines, had too 
little engagement with the electorate, and engaged in backroom 
deals that supersede the voice of voters. Therefore, voters mistrust 
the two-party system and know that it limits (through laws and 
practice) viability of independent and third party choices. 
 
First, the country has increasingly seen voters support anti-
establishment candidates and coalitions. Though voters are often 
faced with tough choices due to the poor viability of independent 
and minor party candidates and the potential for spoiler votes, they 
want change. Examples span the course of the last decade: the rise 
of the Tea Party; Bernie Sanders’ widely supported 2016 primary 
race; the elections of President Trump, Congresswoman 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Congresswoman Ayana Presley; 
the increase in independent candidates running for office over the 
last several years that reached an unprecedented high in the 2018 
midterms; 77  and wins by numerous, new, challengers to 
incumbents in seats throughout New York State.78 
 
Though we have seen high profile wins, voters are still too 
often faced with voting strategically to limit risk and, as a result, 
vote for a major-party candidate despite preferences for an 
alternative or the desire to have other options at all.79 The bulk of 
new candidates have been running in open seats (the majority of 
 
  77 Independent Candidates & The 2018 Election: What We Learned, 
UNITE AM. (2019).), https://docsend.com/view/tdpge9n.  
  78 Grace Segers, How Alexandria Cortez Won the Race That 
Shocked the Country, CITY & ST. N.Y.,. (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/campaigns-elections/how-
alexandria-ocasio-cortez-won-race-shocked-country.html. 
  79 Discrepancy in pre-election polling of voters desires for independent 
candidates in 2018 midterms did not match up with the resulting votes for 
major party backed candidates. According to researchers for Unite America, 
this may be attributed to several factors (social desirability bias, branding of 
major parties, and election day hyper-partisanship activation). These authors 
pose the possibility of these factors being philosophically intertwined with the 
question of strategic voting and trust in process in relation to (and contrast 
with) ideological perspectives. See, What We Learned supra note 75. 
 
 




whom are women and people of color).80 It is still very difficult for 
new candidates (party affiliated or not) to challenge major party-
backed incumbents. This is a viability issue that RCV, in 
conjunction with companion reforms, can begin to address. As 
previously discussed, RCV increases the number of women, new 
candidates, and people of color in candidacies and elected office.81 
 
A second major indicator of growing resistance to 
establishment politics is the increasing number of Americans who 
identify as independent and have moved away from association 
with the two major parties over the last decade. At 42%, the number 
of Americans who identify as independent has grown steadily over 
the last decade as Democrat and Republican party bases have 
diminished. 82  This suggests that voters have an array of 
perspectives that are not, and cannot be, encompassed by two major 
parties. Voters who identify as independent, however, are faced 
with barriers to voting in primary elections across the nation, and 
are forced to choose between refraining from voting in the general, 
voting for a “spoiler” candidate, or voting for a viable candidate 
(almost inevitably backed by a major party). As noted, independent 
voters often end up choosing to vote for the viable candidate. This 
phenomenon will only be exacerbated by the growing threats to 
democracy evident across the nation. 
C. Growing Threats to Democracy 
Two current events (one national and one in New York 
State) have drawn attention to some of the growing threats to voters, 
candidates, and coalitions with non-binary political perspectives. 
 
80 Jennifer Steinhauer, Insurgent Democrats, Many of Them Women, 
Worry a New Party Policy Will Block Them, THE N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/us/politics/dccc-blacklist-incumbent-
policy.html. 
  81 Robert Boatright, Here’s what we’ve learned from the U.S. 
congressional primaries so far, WASH. POST (June 5, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/05/heres-
what-weve-learned-from-the-u-s-congressional-primaries-so-far.  
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Both events are examples of the use of rule or policy changes that 
threaten the already shaky viability of third party opportunities, thus 
threatening to further limit democratic choice of voters. As a result, 
RCV is, again, a timely consideration in relation to the increasing 
affiliation of voters as independent who face existing and potential 
barriers to voting for viable candidates outside of the existing two-
party domination. 
 
First, the national Democratic Congressional Campaign 
Committee implemented a policy prohibiting contracts with firms 
that work with primary challengers to Democrat incumbents.83 
This is problematic for several reasons. It is another hindrance to 
non-major party backed candidates, as well as a symbolic action 
taken to wield and ensure party power. This is incongruent with 
the increasing desire of voters to vote independently. Relatedly, 
and finally, it is a hindrance to voters (consciously and not) who 
want to step out of strategic voting and away from the established 
brand and “safety” of the two major parties. 
 
Second, New York State’s Public Campaign Financing 
Commission, created in 2019 to establish a public campaign 
financing option, released several rule changes that threaten the 
existence of minor parties and voter choice. The commission voted, 
on November 25, 2019, to make three major changes that will 
impact minor parties and independent candidates. First, the 
commission voted to increase the threshold of votes needed for third 
parties to have an ongoing line on a ballot from 50,000 in a 
gubernatorial election year to130,000 biannually. 84  Second, the 
commission voted to restrict eligibility for public financing of 
Assembly and Senate seat races to donations from inside districts 
while simultaneously refraining from limiting party committee 
acquired donations to backed candidates.85 Third, the commission 
 
83 Id. 
  84 Samar Khurshid, State Commission Approves New Campaign 
Finance System, Raises Bar for Political Party Ballot Access, GOTHAM 
GAZETTE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/state/8952-state-
commission-approves-new-campaign-finance-system-and-raises-bar-for-
political-party-ballot-access. 
  85 Those who oppose the requirement of in-district donations say 
this gives an advantage to incumbents and will make new-comer challenges 
all the more difficult. See id. 




voted to raise the threshold of petition signatures for statewide races 
from 15,000 to 45,0000.86  The legislature failed to hold a special 
session and, therefore, the changes became law.87 
 
These changes are widely debated. Opponents argue the 
changes are intended to restrict minor parties and ensure major 
party power and, specifically, to punish the Working Families 
Party, which endorsed Governor Cuomo’s opponent in the last 
gubernatorial race.88 Minor party candidates have only just been 
able to meet the 50,000 vote threshold because of fusion voting 
(another at-risk method in New York State), suggesting that it will 
be that much harder to meet the higher threshold and could easily 
threaten the viability of minor parties.89 Additionally, opponents 
argue the sudden changes made by the commission toward more 
restrictive rules suggest backroom dealing with the two prominent 
leaders pushing for restrictions to minor parties (Governor Cuomo 
and the State Democratic Committee Chairman).90  Though the 
commission has received praise for working to adopt a public 
financing system that will help fund additional campaigns, the 
commission has also been critiqued for stepping outside of the 
public financing mission to restrict ballot access to third parties.91 
 
86 Id.  
  87 Vivian Wang, Democrats’ Secret Plan to Kill Third Parties in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/nyregion/election-third-party-ny.html. 
  88 See, Khurshid, supra note 82.  
  89 The new threshold is more than 4 times the state-wide enrollment of 
the Green Party; close to 3 times that of the Working Families Party, and more 
than 13 times the state-wide enrollment of the Libertarian Party. The 
Independence Party (widely regarded in WNY political circles as an arm of the 
Republican party) is well above the amount with over 400,000 voters, and the 
Conservative Party appears to be in safe territory as well, with around 160,000 
voters state-wide. See NYS Voter Enrollment by County, Party Affiliation and 
Status: Voters Registered as of Feb. 1, 2019, N.Y. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS at 9, 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_feb19.pdf. 
  90 Karen DeWitt, Abrupt Reversal by NY Campaign Finance 
Commission Leaves Supporters Wondering, WAMC N.E. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 
25, 2019), https://www.wamc.org/post/abrupt-reversal-ny-campaign-
finance-commission-leaves-supporters-wondering. 
  91 Brennan Center Responds to New York State Public Financing 
Commission Vote and Draft Recommendations, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. 
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
opinion/brennan-center-responds-new-york-state-public-financing-
commission-vote. 
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Moreover, arguably, the public financing rules themselves do not 
truly level the playing field.   
 
Proponents argue that the commission changes will make 
elections less costly for the public and ensure the legitimacy of third 
parties, which some argue are too often frivolous and create 
confusion on the ballot.92 The Chair of the State Democratic Party 
went so far as to argue that a “credible” minor party should be able 
to produce the proposed numbers to get on the ballot.93 However, 
these sweeping statements discount the history of voter choice (or 
lack thereof) in this country, as well as other current, intersecting 
election laws and rules that have ingrained the two-party system into 
every step of the election process and ensured major barriers to 
independent and minor party candidates (and their supporting 
voters). 
 
The commission’s changes favor incumbents (who will most 
likely already have the backing of a major party, a fund base, and 
name recognition) and major parties (which have established 
resources and unrestricted additional donations), and, therefore, 
threaten the democratic process for voters and candidates. The 
growing number of independent voters already face an array of 
barriers to vote in our democratic elections as they desire. They want 
to support greater democracy through RCV, which would increase 
overall election turnout. We should ask how to make election 
processes more open, democratic, and easier for voters. RCV, in 
conjunction with related reforms, has the potential to address the 
challenge to minor parties and shift towards greater viability of more 
of a variety of candidacies. 
VII. RCV & COMPANION ELECTORAL REFORM 
RCV exists interdependently within the context of other 
election laws and reform efforts. As a result, RCV may be more 
effective in furthering the growth of our democracy if supplemented 
 
92 Wang, supra note 85. 
  93 Karen DeWitt, New York Public Finance Commission Plan 
Condemned By State’s Minor Political Parties, WSKG NPR (Nov. 26, 
2019), https://wskg.org/news/ny-public-finance-commission-plan-
condemned-by-states-minor-political-parties/. 




with additional reforms. Campaign finance, multimember districts, 
and ballot access make strong potential companion reforms to 
further the impact of RCV. They will be briefly examined here. 
A. Campaign Finance Reform94 
RCV alone cannot fix a flawed electoral system. Among the 
companion reforms, campaign finance is key for striving toward a 
more democratic system. From advertisements and literature to 
candy for parades and refreshments for volunteers (and a new 
development—childcare expenses), every campaign will cost some 
money. Without it, candidates often fail to be taken seriously by the 
media, potential donors, and the voters (who are forced to vote 
strategically). To ease this burden, public financing is meant to 
make it possible for lesser-known, or more independent candidates 
to run for office in an arena that has long favored more popular, 
well-funded candidates, who are better able to raise funds. 
 
The need to ease this burden, in large part, stems from the 
United States Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission, in which the court found that, just as 
individuals, corporations have a First Amendment right to 
contribute to campaigns, and, therefore, laws severely restricting 
that right are unconstitutional.95 Since 2010 when it was decided, 
Citizens United has been synonymous with the concept of allowing 
“big money” into our elections,96 and many have called for the 
 
94 “There are two things that are important in politics. The first is 
money, and I can’t remember what the second one is.”—Marcus Alonzo Hanna 
quoted in Adam Winkler, WE THE CORPORATIONS 200 (2018); “A 
corporation will subscribe to a political party only because the corporation 
expects that party...to do something for the benefit of the corporation or to 
refrain from doing something to its injury. No other motive can be imagined.”—
Alton Parker. Id. at 202. 
  95 Campaign Finance Reform, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/campaign-finance-reform. 
96 Id.; Though, corporate funds influencing elections has been an 
increasing problem since at least the late 1800s. In his book, We the 
Corporations, Adam Winkler notes a famous political cartoon, The Bosses of 
the Senate, that depicts the extent to which it was popularly believed (and for 
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decision to be overturned.97 Citizens United is one area of focus in 
relation to campaign finance reform; however, an assessment of 
methods of public financing is an additional and necessary area for 
consideration. 
 
Public financing can take many forms. Interestingly, since 
1958, Germany has publicly financed political parties who act as a 
conduit for the funds to individual candidates. 98  Currently, the 
government allots up to 133 million Euros to each party, including 
minor parties.99 In the United States, President Theodore Roosevelt, 
circa 1910, advocated for a similar system, calling for Congress to 
appropriate the sums needed to cover the “proper and legitimate 
expenses of each of the great national parties.”100 But the major 
parties already have too much power; even if minor parties could 
stand to benefit from such an approach, we hesitate to recommend 
such a model here. 
 
Other models do appear to lend themselves more to 
empowering individuals (as opposed to large money donors). One 
method, currently available in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, is 
 
good reason I’m sure) corporate funds were influencing elections; he goes on to 
explain how Marus Alonzo Hanna modernized the political campaign to rely 
more heavily on corporations, an effort which resulted in the most money raised 
for a presidential campaign at the time ($7million); and, finally, how 
corporations were still very much a part of the politics at the beginning of the 
twentieth century when a scandal erupted as it was discovered 70% of Theodore 
Roosevelt’s campaign funds were attributed to corporate donations, a fact he had 
vehemently denied (to protect his image Theodore Roosevelt fought for laws to 
restrict corporate donations). See Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How 
American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights 196-205 (2018). Winkler 
concludes, “[a]lthough Citizens United and Hobby Lobby brought new public 
attention and scrutiny to corporate rights, long before those controversial cases 
were decided corporations had already taken their place among We the People.” 
Id. at 395 (alteration in original). 
  97 Id. 
98 Campaign Finance: Germany, LIBR. OF CONG., 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/germany.php. 
  99 Id. The only requirement to receive funds as a party is to receive 
.5% of the vote. In New York, if 12 million people voted that would be 
60,000 votes. Cf. New York’s new public financing rules, in which a party 
isn’t even eligible to appear on the ballot with less than 130,000 votes. 
  100 See Public Campaign Financing: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES., http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 
20, 2020). 




the Clean Elections Method. Under this method, candidates are 
encouraged to obtain small dollar donations (typically $5 or less) 
and if a certain threshold is met, the state will give the candidate the 
maximum amount of dollars for the race.101 In 2014, the maximum 
amount of money for Arizona’s gubernatorial race was $1.1 
million.102  
Another method is matching donations, which is available 
to candidates in New York City. Candidates for eligible positions 
agree to fund limits, spending limits, and financial disclosure 
reports, and in exchange they are awarded $8 public for every $1 
donated.103 In New York State’s implementation of the matching 
funds program by the Public Finance Commission, however, we are 
reminded that laudable intentions may still fall prey to political 
gamesmanship.104  
As of February 2019, fourteen states offer some form of 
public financing. The system is not perfect; however, if paired 
with the benefits of RCV, our findings lead us to believe that 
public financing campaign programs will become more valuable, 
offering greater opportunities to independent candidacies and 
greater opportunities for a new generation of leaders. 
B. Multi-member districts: What can we learn from history? 
A single representative can’t possibly represent all the 
interests of a district, and from the history of PR (discussed in 
Section II: RCV History), there is already a vision of what multi-
member districts would look like in the modern day. The vision 
offers the promise of greater, more effective representation of the 
electorate and a greater, more collegial democratic process. 





  103 See Join the Matching Funds Program, N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN. 
BD., https://www.nyccfb.info/candidate-services/join/ (last visited Dec. 16, 
2019). 
  104 See discussion supra Part V.C. 
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As for the mechanics of counting votes in a multi-member 
district, the RCV process in a multi-member district (PR or STV) 
operates similarly to that of a single-member district in that voters 
have the opportunity to rank candidates on their individual ballots. 
If a majority winner results from the first round, that candidate is 
the winner and use of the instant run-off process is not necessary. 
If there is no majority winner, the instant-runoff process ensues, 
with votes from the candidate with the least first choice votes being 
distributed in each subsequent round.105 The difference in a multi-
member district is that “excess votes” from candidates who have 
already met the threshold to win are also distributed. 106  This 
process is continued until winning candidates are identified for 
each available vacancy. 
 
Though this paper recommends multi-member districts as a 
companion reform to RCV, non-RCV multi-member districts have 
had challenges that are worth recognizing and avoiding in moving 
forward. In Thornburg v. Gingles,107  the United States Supreme 
Court heard arguments on whether five multi-member districts and 
one single-member district in North Carolina diluted the votes of 
African American voters, violating §2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 
court found the multi-member districts did indeed affect the ability 
of the minority community to elect their representative of choice.108 
In support of its finding, the lower court noted the multi-member 
district structure was problematic when combined with targeted race 
campaigns, the State’s history of voter suppression, and other 
troubling data such as the fact that white voters declined to vote for 
African-American voters at least two-thirds of the time.109 Relying 
on these facts, the Court ultimately affirmed that the multimember 




  105 See discussion supra Part I. 
106 See How Proportional Representation Elections Work, supra note 
10. 
107 478 U.S. 30 (1985). 
  108 Id. at 80. 
  109 Id. at 59, 80. 
  110 Id. at 80. 




For two reasons, this, however, is no reason to reject 
multimember districts. First, there are many forms of multi-member 
districts. As we saw with the RCV multimember option adopted in 
the U.S. in the early twentieth century, minority communities had 
more success with that system than ever before prior to its 
enactment. Second, due to gerrymandering, it is possible for African 
American voters to just as easily be disenfranchised in single-
member districts.111 Therefore, while certain multi-member districts 
have been problematic for communities of color, PR’s history 
suggests the potential of multi-member districts to increase political 
inclusion for minorities, and, as a result, should be explored as a 
further enhancement to the benefits RCV offers. 
C. Ballot access reforms 
Ballot access is another necessary companion reform to 
support improved democratic functioning generally and to support 
the effectiveness of RCV. In order for RCV to effectively give 
voters greater choice through viable and diverse candidacies, a 
broad array of candidates need to get on the ballot. Currently, 
independent and minor party candidates face numerous challenges 
throughout the process of getting on the ballot. From acquiring 
signatures to disputing challenges to petitions, the process favors 
highly established and funded major parties and their candidates. 
 
Unlike major party backed candidates, other candidates 
often face an uphill battle to get on the ballot when petitioning 
signatures are required as a prerequisite. Resources such as 
 
  111 In the City of Buffalo, one particular council district has been 
unable to elect an African American for decades, despite a significant amount 
of the district being made up of majority African American neighborhoods. 
The unusual horseshoe shape of the district is evidence of a district cobbled 
together in such a way as to dilute the votes of African Americans in the 
district. In 2019, again, the district was unable to elect an African American 
representative despite the candidacies of four African Americans in total. A 
quick analysis of the election numbers reveals even in a multi-member (PR) 
scenario with two seats available, the other white candidate in the race would 
have come in second place. In other words, because of the drawing of the 
district, Black representation would only have been possible if three seats were 
available, reinforcing, yet again, the idea that RCV is only one tool of many 
that must be examined in moving toward a more democratic system. 
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financial and human capital are often inadequate. Additionally, 
minor party candidates face the challenge of obtaining enough 
signatures from the smaller pool of eligible voters (who are 
affiliated with that minor party).112 
 
Even if candidates are able to meet the threshold for 
signatures and then file, the challenging process is fraught with 
difficulties and, arguably, undemocratic as well. 113  Though the 
process was originally established to reduce and deter fraud, 
candidates and parties are able to use the process to knock 
candidates off the ballot simply to reduce competition. When 
candidates are challenging the system independently, there is 
increased room for error in minor and major technicalities that can 
weaken chances of successfully disputing a challenge. 114 
Candidates (including major party candidates) are encouraged to get 
three times the requirement to account for errors (unclear signatures, 
missing zip code or city, etc.),115 but this then brings us back to the 
challenge for independent and minor party candidates of getting 
even the threshold requirement. Additionally, because independent 
candidates often do not have the resources to challenge the major 
party endorsed candidate, there is not an equitable opportunity to 
“use” the process to knock those candidates off the ballot. 
Objections to a designating petition in New York State must be filed 
within three days.116 That is not necessarily a feasible time frame for 
minor party or independent candidates who likely do not have access 
to adequate resources to review and file objections. Lastly, it is 
undemocratic to knock off competition before the electorate has 
even had an opportunity to weigh in through a full vote.117 Though 
 
112 DeNora Getachew, Understanding the Labyrinth: New York’s 
Ballot Access Laws, GOTHAM GAZETTE, 
https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/advertise/252-understanding-the-
labyrinth-new-yorks-ballot-access-laws. 
  113 Both authors are unfortunate enough to have been witness and 
subject to this process in the local political arena. 
114 Alan Bedenko, Electoral Malpractice, THE PUB., Apr. 18, 2019 
(Reporting on five independent candidates [all women] whose ballots were 
challenged for technical deficiencies), 
http://www.dailypublic.com/articles/04182019/electoral-malpractice. 
115  DeNora Getachew, Understanding the Labyrinth: New York’s 
Ballot Access Laws, supra n.____. 
116 Running for Office, N.Y. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS, 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/RunningOffice.html. 
117 As opposed to challenges to legitimately fraudulent petitions. 




some may argue that petitioning is an opportunity for the electorate 
to weigh in on the legitimacy of a candidate to be considered for 
elected office, this argument does not take into account the full 
picture: lack of resources, knowledge of the process, and the fact 
that the petitioning process itself does not allow all voters (or all 
voters within that party) the opportunity to weigh in. 
 
Some states have implemented alternatives to petitioning for 
signatures. One alternative is the submission of filing fees for 
certain political races; however, those states that allow this are 
constitutionally required to provide the option to file as indigent if 
the cost of the fee is too high for a candidate.118 Depending on the 
state, the indigent candidate may be excused, given the alternative 
option of petitioning for signatures, or pay a reduced fee.119 Some 
argue for the alternative of open ballot access entirely and others 
express concern about having chaotic and confusing ballots, 
illegitimate parties, or fraud without at least some ballot access 
requirements. 
 
Ballot access is a necessary companion reform to support 
improved democratic functioning. With RCV, more minor party and 
independent candidates have greater opportunities to get on the 
ballot. If ballot access is going to be limited in some form, it should 
be considered contextually to allow for fair and equitable 
opportunities for democratic processes to proceed. To do this, more 
questions need to be asked. If filing fees are required, are they 
nominal across the board or are fees tiered depending on resources? 
If petitioning signatures are required, are the requirements across 
the board, dependent on party member numbers or geography, or 
dependent on the resources of coalition/ party affiliation?120 Is it 
possible for voters to sign for more than one candidate?121 Lastly, 
 
118 Filing Fees for Candidates for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/filing-fees-for-candidates-for-state-legislators.aspx. 
119 Id. 
120 Getting on the Ballot: What it Takes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, 27 The Canvass: State and Election Reform 1-3 (Feb. 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/elect/Canvass_Feb_2012_ 
No_27.pdf. 
121 In New York, a voter cannot sign more than one petition for an 
office unless there is more than one vacancy for the office. N.Y. Election Law § 
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what are the deadline requirements for new parties? We will move 
toward a better democracy if we ask such questions. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
It is incumbent upon us as citizens to be proactive in 
responding to the growing threats to our democracy by considering 
the use of RCV and suggested companion reforms for the betterment 
of our democracy. As the health of democracy is on the minds of so 
many Americans, let us remember our history and look at our 
present in which we see more governments choosing the benefits of 
RCV that we once chose to forego as a result of prejudice and fear. 
Let us also look to our future and all we stand to gain in 
implementing RCV and its companion reforms. Finally, in our 
current political state Franklin D. Roosevelt’s words ring truer than 
ever: “the only thing to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, 






6-134(3). As a result, it is a common strategy for major party candidates to 
“steal.” 
